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Abstract
We examine the hypothesis that driven by a competition heuristic, people don't even reflect
or consider whether a cooperation strategy may be better. As a paradigmatic example of
this behavior we propose the zero-sum game fallacy, according to which people believe
that resources are fixed even when they are not. We demonstrate that people only cooper-
ate if the competitive heuristic is explicitly overridden in an experiment in which participants
play two rounds of a game in which competition is suboptimal. The observed spontaneous
behavior for most players was to compete. Then participants were explicitly reminded that
the competing strategy may not be optimal. This minor intervention boosted cooperation,
implying that competition does not result from lack of trust or willingness to cooperate but
instead from the inability to inhibit the competition bias. This activity was performed in a con-
trolled laboratory setting and also as a crowd experiment. Understanding the psychological
underpinnings of these behaviors may help us improve cooperation and thus may have
vast practical consequences to our society.
Introduction
In situations that involve scarce resources such as space, time, or goods, people sometimes
engage in some form of competitive behavior even when they would be better off if a co-
operation agreement could be reached. One important case is the zero-sum (or lump of labor)
fallacy, which has been used to study several topics in economic theory, such as poverty, unem-
ployment, retirement, and immigration [1] [2]. The claim is that lack of cooperation may result
from the belief that resources are fixed even when they are not. This leads to the potentially
misleading conclusion that, in society, if somebody wins somebody else has to lose. In addition,
people derive value and pleasure from competition and from beating the rival, even when there
are no monetary rewards at stake. When the benefits or cooperation are not evident or explicit,
as it happens with the zero-sum fallacy, the tendency to compete may override the possible
benefits of cooperation [3].
Another reason why people may be reluctant to cooperate is lack of trust, since this makes
one vulnerable to the actions of others. There is a vast tradition of investigating which factors
determine whether a person will or will not trust strangers [4], [5], [6], [7], which has relied in
classic economic games.
This work examines the hypothesis that driven by a competition heuristic, people do not
even reflect or consider whether a cooperation strategy may be better. If the hypothesis is
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correct, there is a simple way to nudge cooperation: it suffices to make subjects reflect explicitly
on whether competition is indeed an optimal strategy.
In the experiments we conducted, we asked participants to repeatedly play the “thumb war
game” (TWG), a game in which players score a point when they pin the opponent’s thumb
(placing one thumb on top of the other one) to a count of three. We told participants that the
goal was to make as many points as possible, which was reinforced by monetary payoffs pro-
portional to the points achieved at the end of the game. We show that participants were driven
by the zero-sum fallacy and competed to win the game. Playing to pin the opponent’s thumb
takes longer than cooperating, and hence it does not maximize the number of points that both
opponents make. The crucial result is that a nudge in which we simply reminded participants
that a competing strategy may not be optimal boosts cooperation. This suggests that competi-
tion does not result from lack of trust or willingness to cooperate but instead from the inability
to inhibit the competition bias.
Above and beyond the specific goal of investigating the drive for competition and coopera-
tion, our work has one complementary motivation: to investigate the possibility of obtaining
reliable data in a large sample capitalizing on crowd experiments. To this aim, we perform two
almost identical experiments: one in a traditional lab settings, and another in a large theater
with over one thousand people performing the experiment simultaneously. The latter allows us
to obtain very large samples which provide a unique possibility to address a) the issue of reli-
ability which has been a matter of substantial debate in psychological experiments [8] and b)
the inference of psychological principles based on a very limited segment of the population
[9,10,11,12]
Materials and Methods
In this section we describe the general aspects of all treatments. Table 1 provides specific details
of participants and conditions for each treatment.
Participants
Experiment 1. 64 volunteers (35.94% women, 64.06% men, age: 18–24 years old) partici-
pated in a laboratory experiment.
Experiment 2. 2391 volunteers (1540 players without counting referees) participated in a
crowd experiment (46.90% women, 53.10% men, age: 18–32 years old), which was performed
in a large theater.
Experiment 3. 16 volunteers participated in classroom experiment (84.62% women,
15.38% men, age: 24–62 years old).
Experiment 4. 28 volunteers participated in classroom experiment (28% women, 72%
men, age: 21–52 years old).
All participants were native Spanish speakers and all experiments were conducted in Span-
ish. Consent documentation: Participants provided a verbal consent simply responding to
the research assistants the willingness to participate; there is no written consent documenta-
tion. Participants did not sign a written consent form due to the brevity of the experiment.
Participants were informed that participation in the experiment was completely voluntary
and they could simply choose not to participate. Participants were explicitly assured that a)
their participation in the experiment was completely voluntary and that they could leave the
experiment at any time and b) that all the data was completely anonymous. The consent
procedure described here was approved by the Ethics Committee of CEMIC (Comité de
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Ética de la Dirección de Investigación del Centro de Educación Médica e Investigaciones
Clínicas “Norberto Quirno,” Unidad Asociada del CONICET (Protocol # 435)).
Procedure
In all experiments, participants played two one-minute rounds of sequential TWG. The
rules, described in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thumb_war, are as follows: two players join
their right hands together leaving their thumbs up, they greet moving their thumbs left and
right three times, and they start playing moving their thumbs to hold one’s thumb on top of
the other’s for three seconds. The first one to do it scores a point. Participants were asked to
play with their eyes closed.
The instructions given to participants by the experimenter before the first round were: “You
are going to play thumb war games for 60 seconds, and each one’s goal is to make as many
points as possible. You must play with your eyes closed.”
Between both rounds the experimenter said: “Now you are going to play for another 60 sec-
onds. But first, I want you to remember what your goal was to make as many points as pos-
sible. This does NOT imply that you should compete against the other or make more points
than your opponent. Actually, there might other ways of playing by which both of you can
reach your goal.”
Table 1. Summary of all treatments’ information about participants and conditions. Includes; purpose of the experiment, number of participants, gen-
der distribution, age range in years, if participants were allowed to discuss a cooperation strategy or not, and what kind of incentives were given in each
treatment).
Treatment Purpose Place Nr. of
participants
Gender
Distribution
Age
range
years
Where allowed to
discuss a
cooperation
Strategy (Yes/No)
Incentives
1 Investigate the tendency to compete
even when there are monetary
incentives to cooperate and when
cooperation strategies cannot be
discussed explicitly.
Laboratory 64 W: 35.94% M:
64.06%
18–24 No Monetary
2A The purpose of this treatment is to
collect a large sample to: 1) Identify the
effect ofdemographic variables in the
tendency to cooperate. 2) Investigate
the robustness of laboratory measure in
a situation closer to real-life. 3) See if
the cooperation ratio remains similar
even when there are no monetary
rewards.
Theater 850 W: 47% M:
53%
18–32 No Obtain as
many points as
possible.
2B To investigate whether allowing
participants to talk promotes
cooperation.
Theater 690 W: 46% M:
54%
18–32 Yes Obtain as
many points as
possible.
3 Control treatment to investigate whether
change in cooperation in the second
round results from instructions or
instead from playing the game twice.
Classroom 16 W: 84.62% M:
15.38%
24–62 Yes Obtain as
many points as
possible.
4 To determine whether after shifting from
competition to cooperation participants
have an explicit understanding that
cooperation results in larger gains.
Classroom 28 W: 28% M:
72%
21–52 Yes Obtain as
many points as
possible.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147125.t001
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The exact instructions varied for each treatment: in Experiment 1 they included details
about monetary rewards, in Experiment 2 whether they were allowed to talk or not and in
Experiment 3 there were NO further instructions between rounds. The exact instruction
provided for each experiment are presented in Spanish and English in Table 2.
Table 2. Summary of instructions given to subjects in each treatment. Both in English (translation) and Spanish (original version).
Treatment Instructions (English Version) Original Instructions (Spanish Version)
1 R1: You are going to play thumb war games for 60 seconds,
and each one’s goal is to make as many points as possible.
For each point won, you will get $2 (pesos) at the end of the
experiment. You must play with your eyes closed and from
now on, you are not allowed to talk to each other.
R1: Van a jugar una “pulseada china” por 1 minuto, y el
objetivo de cada uno es hacer la mayor cantidad de puntos
posibles. Por cada punto ganado, recibirán $2 pesos al ﬁnal
del experimento. Deben jugar con los ojos cerrados y
además desde ahora, tienen prohibido hablar entre ustedes.
R2: Ok, now you are going to play for another 60 seconds.
But ﬁrst, I want you to remember what your goal was: to
make as many points as possible. This does NOT imply that
you should compete against the other or make more points
than your opponent. Actually, there might be another way in
which both of you can reach your goal.
R2: Bien, ahora van a jugar por otros 60 segundos, con las
mismas reglas. Pero primero, quiero que recuerden cual era
el objetivo de cada uno: hacer la mayor cantidad de puntos
posibles. Esto NO implica que deben competir con su
compañero o que tienen que hacer mas puntos que el. De
hecho, puede que exista otra manera en que ambos logren
mejor su objetivo.
2A (Oral instructions
given by the
experimenter)
R1: You are going to play for one minute. The goal of each
player is to score, in that minute, as many points as possible.
The thumb war is played blindly, with eyes closed. Let's start.
R1: Van a jugar una “pulseada china” por 1 minuto. El gol de
cada jugador es hacer, en ese minuto, la mayor cantidad de
puntos posibles. La pulseada se juega a ciegas, con los ojos
cerrados. Empecemos.
R2: We will go for another round. But before that I remind
you again of the exact instructions I gave you of the game:
each player has to try to score as many points as possible. I
remind you that this doesn't mean having to score more
points than the other player. It doesn't mean that if you lose
you have to feel bad or that you have to make more points
than the others. Each person has to think how to achieve the
goal you have. You may need to collaborate, cooperate, you
guess. Let's play again with the goal each one has of trying
to score as many points as possible: no matter if everyone
scores a lot as well, what you want is to do as many points
as possible.
R2: Ahora vamos a jugar otra ronda. Pero antes de eso,
quiero recordarles nuevamente las instrucciones exactas que
les di del juego: cada jugador debe intentar hacer la mayor
cantidad de puntos posibles. Les recuerdo que esto no
quiere decir que deben hacer mas puntos que el otro
jugador. No signiﬁca que si pierden tienen que sentirse mal o
que tienen que hacer mas puntos que el resto. Cada uno
debe pensar como alcanzar su objetivo. Quizás tengan que
colaborar, cooperar, ustedes verán.Volvamos a jugar con el
objetivo que tiene cada uno de hacer la mayor cantidad de
puntos posibles: no importa si el resto también hace muchos
puntos, lo que ustedes buscan es hacer la mayor cantidad de
puntos posibles.
2A (Written instructions
given to each participant)
Players are not allowed to talk to each other Los jugadores no pueden hablar entre ellos.
2B Similar to A without the written instructions forbidding
conversation
Similar to A without the written instructions forbidding
conversation
3 R1: You are going to play thumb war games for 60 seconds,
and each one’s goal is to make as many points as possible.
You must play with your eyes closed.
R1: Van a jugar una pulseada china por un minuto, y el
objetivo de cada uno es hacer la mayor cantidad de puntos
posibles. Deben jugar con los ojos cerrados.
R2: Ok, now you are going to play for another 60 seconds.
Each one’s goal is to make as many points as possible. You
must play with your eyes closed.
R2: Bien, ahora van a jugar por otros 60 segundos. El
objetivo de cada uno es hacer la mayor cantidad de puntos
posibles. Deben jugar con los ojos cerrados.
4 R1: You are going to play thumb war games for 60 seconds,
and each one’s goal is to make as many points as possible.
You must play with your eyes closed.
R1: Van a jugar una pulseada china por un minuto, y el
objetivo de cada uno es hacer la mayor cantidad de puntos
posibles. Deben jugar con los ojos cerrados.
R2: Ok, now you are going to play for another 60 seconds.
But ﬁrst, I want you to remember what your goal was: to
make as many points as possible. This does NOT imply that
you should compete against the other or make more points
than your opponent. Actually, there might be another way in
which both of you can reach your goal.
R2: Bien, ahora van a jugar por otros 60 segundos, con las
mismas reglas. Pero primero, quiero que recuerden cual era
el objetivo de cada uno: hacer la mayor cantidad de puntos
posibles. Esto NO implica que deben competir con su
compañero o que tienen que hacer mas puntos que el. De
hecho, puede que exista otra manera en que ambos logren
mejor su objetivo.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147125.t002
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Specific procedures for each experiment. Experiment 1 took place in a lab setting. The
experimenter gave the instructions and annotated the results of the game. Participants were
asked to not talk during the experiment. This was done, in this specific treatment, to inquire
about the emergence of collaboration when there is no opportunity for the players to discuss
about specific strategies. Participants in Experiment 1 were paid 2 Argentine pesos (equivalent
to approximately 0.25 US dollars as of early 2015) for each point they scored.
Experiment 2 was conducted in a theater, in the context of a TEDx activity (http://
tedxriodelaplata.org/tedxperiments/pulseada-china). The experimenter gave the instruc-
tions to the audience from the stage. Participants were asked to self organize in groups of
three. In each group, two participants were randomly assigned roles of players, while the
third participant was assigned the role of “referee.” The referees were given sheets of paper
that contained a) the written instructions that complemented the oral instructions provided
by the experimenter and b) a form in which they could fill the results of the games played by
the players of their group.
The experimenter orally announced the beginning and the end of each round and all groups
played simultaneously. After the end of each round, referees had a minute to complete the
forms. Figure A in S1 Fig shows the form used to record the results of the experiment. This
form was specially designed to allow referees to record rapidly and unambiguously the
information of the rounds and to be easily scanned with an automatic procedure as
described below.
The information recorded by referees was: (a) participants’ demographic information (age
and gender) (b) the results of the all the games of the round up to a maximum of eleven
games (c) whether players cooperated and who proposed cooperation, (d) whether someone
opened the eyes (even if the instructions asked them not to do so), (e) whether one of the
players initiated a conversation to propose cooperation and (f) whether one of the players
(or both) broke the cooperation agreement. Referees could also explain how the negotiation
took place if there was any.
As we collected a large amount of data in this experiment, we designed the form so that it
could be processed using automatic optical mark recognition (OMR). The score sheet had a
table of 11 columns and 2 rows with predefined boxes in which the referee marked which
player won the games (Figure A in S1 Fig). There was an additional box in which they could
handwrite the total number of games won by each player, in case the total number of games
exceeded 11. The automatic recognition procedure could not process the total of games won
(if they were more than 11) and hence for all analyses in this manuscript we considered
results up to the 11th game of each round.
Treatment 2a/2b: Referees were randomly assigned one of two sheets with instructions corre-
sponding to treatment 2a or 2b. The only difference between these treatments was that in 2a,
referees were asked to tell the players that they should not talk throughout the game (during
rounds or between them). This manipulation was done to investigate the difference in the
emergence of cooperation when there is or when there is not opportunity to discuss strategies.
Experiment 3 was conducted in a classroom. The experimenter gave the instructions in
front of the class to all participants. Participants were asked to find a partner to play with
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(the person seating on their back/front). After each round in the experiment, we handed in
paper sheets where each participant self-reported their results. The difference of Experiment
3 compared to all other experiments is that subjects were not provided further instructions
between the first and second round. This was done to inquire whether a change of strategy
between rounds resulted from additional instructions or simply from having played the
game for a second time.
Experiment 4 was conducted in a classroom. The setup was almost identical to Experiment
3. The two differences were a) Additional instructions were presented to participants
between rounds as in Experiments 1 and 2, and b) After having completed the game, partici-
pants who cooperated in round two but not in round one responded a questionnaire
explaining the reasons for that change.
Theoretical Framework
To complement the experiments, we describe a theoretical game that captures the sequence
of play of the experiments. This model can be found in Secion 4, “Theoretical Framework”.
We characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game, and show that cooperation
emerges as a dominant strategy for parameter combinations matching what was empirically
observed in the experiments.
Results
We performed two core experiments (1 and 2) and two control experiments (3 and 4). Experi-
ment 1 took place in a classic lab setting where two participants played TWG against each
other while Experiment 2 was performed in a large theater where over one thousand partici-
pants played simultaneously. In all experiments, participants played two one-minute rounds
that consisted of as many sequential TWG as they could play in this finite time budget. The
objective of each player was to maximize the total number of points scored in a round. In
Experiment 1, subjects were given a monetary payoff proportional to the amount of points
gained, to align incentives with the stated goal. This game is not zero-sum, since the total num-
ber of TWGs played in a minute depends on the players’ strategies. Specifically, if the TWG
game is played for k rounds, which we refer as TWG(k), the game is zero-sum for all k. How-
ever, the key aspect here is that k is not determined in advance because, instead, players are
playing for one minute.
By agreeing to play quick games with an alternating winner, both players can obtain more
points than when engaged in competition. This is assuming that when players agree to cooper-
ate, irrespective of the actual cooperation pattern, the lack of competition might make the
game go faster (hence, they end up playing more rounds in one minute). Whether cooperation
leads or not to larger gains depends on parameters of the game (mainly the total time taken by
a round when they compete or cooperate as well as the likelihood that each player wins in each
game). The parameters in our experiment are such that cooperation is beneficial and competi-
tion suboptimal. Please refer to the theoretical framework described in Section 4 for more
details.
Our aim is to distinguish between three hypotheses:
H1. Collaboration: Players will cooperate in a simple game when cooperation leads to
increased gains.
Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment
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H2. Zero-sum fallacy: Players do not cooperate because they fail to see that the best strategy is
to cooperate. Once they receive the nudge that takes them out of the competition heuris-
tic, they shift to cooperation.
H3. Reluctance to cooperate: Players do not want to cooperate because they do not want to
do so even when they are aware that cooperation increases payoffs.
The three hypotheses make distinct predictions on the pattern of cooperation in both
rounds. H1 predicts cooperation in both rounds, H2 predicts very low levels of cooperation in
the first round and a marked increase in cooperation in the second round (when the possible
suboptimality of competition is made explicit), and H3 predicts high levels of competition in
both rounds.
Experiment 1 was performed in a classic lab setting, which allowed us to verify that both
players listened attentively to the instructions. Participants played the round of TWG with
their eyes closed and were instructed not to speak. We did this to make Rounds 1 and 2 as simi-
lar as possible by restricting the possibility of accumulating shared verbal knowledge through-
out the experiment. This also makes collaboration more difficult since participants need to
negotiate by implicit actions. Experiment 2 was performed in a large-scale setup at a theater.
As a comparative advantage, this allowed us to collect large quantities of data, which could
then be used to regress the data to several demographical variables and to investigate the
dynamics of negotiation. It also has the advantage of analyzing cooperation in a situation closer
to real life in which instructions are expressed clearly but the degree of attention of participants
to the instructions vary widely. Additionally, in Experiment 2 we investigated the effect of ver-
bal negotiations.
Average scores aggregated within each dyad (Fig 1) and for each individual player (Fig 2)
showed an almost three-fold increase in the points obtained in the second round: Experiment 1
(Round 1: 3.1875±0.3874, Round 2: 9.5±0.4709) and Experiment 2 (Round 1: 3.66±0.08,
Round 2: 8.54±0.1). A paired t-test revealed that this effect was highly significant (t = 10.35,
df = 62, p< 0.001 for Experiment 1; t = 36.2, df = 1538, p< 0.001 for Experiment 2).
The aggregated points in the second round show a very high density of occurrence of 11
points, which was the value at which we saturated the score (68.7% for Experiment 1; 47% for
Experiment 2). Instead, the maximum number of points was not attained by any dyad in
Experiment 1 and only in 3.2% of the dyads in Experiment 2. The fact that the gain of both
players (and not that of one player at the expense of the other) increased in the second round
can be seen clearly in the 2-D histogram of paired comparisons (Fig 2). To confirm this statisti-
cally we defined min_gain = min (ΔS1, ΔS2) for each dyad, where ΔSi indicates the difference in
points for player i between Round 2 and Round 1. Negative values of ΔSi indicate that player i
won more points in the first round. Note that if one of the players wins fewer points in Round
2, then min_gain is negative even if this is compensated by an even larger gain of the other
player. The average value of min_gain was positive and significantly above zero for both exper-
iments (Experiment 1: 2.125±0.33, t = 6.396, df = 31, p< 0.004; Experiment 2: 1.17±0.07,
t = 15.1, df = 769, p< 0.001). This shows that on average, in the second round; even for the
player who won the least (or lost the most) the gain is still clearly positive.
Unfolding the dynamics of each dyad in a raster showing the sequence of games won
throughout the minute of play (Fig 3) shows a very clear pattern of cooperation based on an
alternation strategy. Note that for participants of Experiment 1 and for half of those of Experi-
ment 2, this strategy is reached without an explicit conversation. To quantify the degree of
cooperation, we defined for each dyad a binary value set to 1 if both players obtained at least 4
points and to 0 otherwise. Cooperation, under this definition, was much more frequent in the
second round (Experiment 1: 0% in first round and 65.62% in the second round; Experiment 2:
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1.55±0.44% in first round and 40.12±1.76% in the second round) and this increase was highly
significant (p< 0.001 for Experiment 1; p< 0.001 for Experiment 2) as revealed by a Fisher
exact test. This represents an over 30-fold increase in cooperation between the first and second
rounds. If we take a stricter definition of cooperation, by considering a dyad to cooperate only
when they show alternation of victories to the max number of points, then cooperation in
Experiment 1 is still 0% in Round 1 and increases to 59.37% in Round 2. In Experiment 2, it is
0% in Round 1 and increases to 25.7% in Round 2. Note that not even a single one of the 770
recorded dyads achieved this measure of cooperation in the first round.
Fig 1. Histograms of accumulated points between both players for the first (left panel) and second (right panel) rounds.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147125.g001
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Hence, Experiments 1 and 2 are consistent with the zero-sum fallacy (Hypothesis H2), and
inconsistent with the hypotheses of purely selfish or purely cooperative agents. Note that the
fraction of cooperating dyads was larger in Experiment 1 (Experiment 1: 65.62% vs. Experi-
ment 2: 40.12%, p< 0.004), even when considering Experiment 2a and 2b together, regardless
of whether participants who were allowed to speak or not, where allowing participants to speak
Fig 2. Dimensional histogram of the number of points scored by each player. In the first round (left panel) the distribution is clustered close to the origin
showing that players rarely score more than 2 points. In the second round (right panel) the majority of dyads show that both players win 5 or 6 points (11 was
the maximal amount of points they could accumulate).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147125.g002
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increases the tendency to negotiate. This suggests that a real-life noisy environment where
instructions are heard less attentively may strongly affect the range of cooperation and as a
consequence the overall gains of the population.
Experiment 2 was based on a large sample (N = 770 dyads) collected using a crowd experi-
ment. This allowed us to investigate some aspects of the cooperation process and demographic
variables that affect cooperation. Our analysis led us to the following observations:
1. For the talk-is-permitted treatment (2B) and when there was a negotiation, we recorded
whether one of the two players led the negotiation and if that player proposed generous
terms (e.g., “first I lose and then I win”, instead of “first I win, then I lose”). In 28% of the
Fig 3. The image depicts a raster of accumulated points by each player. Each line corresponds to a dyad. Within each line columns indicate in color
whether the first player (yellow) or the second player (red) won. Player 1 is defined arbitrarily as the one that scores the first point. Data are sorted by
sequence proximity to an alternating strategy of cooperation (1-2-1-2-. . .). Perfect alternating cooperation is achieved by a very high fraction of dyads in the
second round (right panels) and with extremely low frequency in the first round (first dyad).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147125.g003
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dyads one of the two players clearly led the negotiation. Of those dyads, 57.28% of the time,
the first game was lost by the player who proposed the negotiation, revealing that most
offers were generous (p< 0.015, binomial distribution).
2. We also investigated the probability of cooperation in Round 2 as a function of the results of
Round 1. Results showed that those dyads achieving a greater score difference in the first
round are less likely to cooperate in the second round than when the first round is more bal-
anced (difference  3: prob = 0.398, difference< 3: prob = 0.6, Fisher exact comparison
p< 0.012).
3. In Experiment 2 we compared the talk-is-permitted (2B) and the talk-is-not-permitted (2A)
treatments. We observed over a two-fold increase in cooperation for those dyads that talk
throughout the game (2B: prob = 0.697, 2A: prob = 0.269, Fisher exact comparison
p< 0.001).
4. There is a significant gender effect in the probability of cooperation in Round 2. Probabili-
ties according to gender are FF = 0.363, MM = 0.647, MF = 0.512, FM = 0.477. Overall, FF
dyads show the least likelihood of collaboration (FF vs. MM, p< 0.006; FF vs. FM, p< 0.02;
FM vs. MM, p< 0.07). These probabilities are compatible with a very simple model in
which the probability of cooperation is ~80% for males and of ~60% for females, and both
players are required to be of the cooperator type to establish cooperation.
Finally, we surveyed people’s intuition about cooperation. To this aim, we described the
experiment (including a full description of the instructions) to 81 participants (25 had partici-
pated in Experiment 2 while the rest had not; both groups show almost identical responses and
hence were averaged them together). Results show that people overall overestimate the likeli-
hood of cooperation in Round 1 (29.7%) and understand that there will be more cooperation
after emphasizing the non-zero-sum aspect of the game (63.7%). Hence people’s beliefs on
how participants would behave reflect an intuition of the zero-sum fallacy but stretch the fact
that its effect is underestimated, at least in the context of this game. People believe that about
one third of participants will cooperate in the first round while results show that almost none
do cooperate, even when it maximizes monetary reward.
H2 hypothesis states that players’ tend to cooperate and earn more points when they are
provided a nudge that explicitly makes them reflect on whether competing is the best strategy
or not. Here we provided evidence of this by showing that they do not cooperate in the first
round, but they do so in the second round. However, it is possible that simply playing the game
twice may lead to such understanding without need of explicit instructions. To collect more
evidence in favor of H2 we ran two additional experiments.
In Experiment 3 participants played two consecutive rounds, each of one minute, as in
Experiments 1 and 2. The difference was that we did not provide further instructions between
both rounds. H2 predicts that without explicit instructions that may shift the frame to a more
cooperating focus, players will still fail to cooperate. In agreement with this hypothesis, results
show that that without further instructions, the number of wins were equal in Round 1 (2.875
±0.6382) and Round 2 (2.687±0.4719), t = -0.2362, df = 30, p = 0.8149. This shows that the
extra experience of playing again does not help players understand that an alternation strategy
may lead to larger payoffs. This provides evidence that a signal to raise their attention to the
fact that competition does not optimize their wins is key to override the fallacy.
In Experiment 4 we sought to inquire about participant’s understanding of why they shift
strategies between Rounds 1 and 2. This allowed us to determine whether there was an explicit
understanding that alternating strategies may lead to larger gains. All the responses provided
by participants were classified depending on whether they made reference to maximization of
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gains and to cooperation (note that the explanation may refer to both, one of them or none.).
First we verify that, as in Experiments 1 and 2, gains by each player increased significantly in
the second round (Round 1: 1.3571±0.2780, Round 2: 6.4286±1.4973, t = 3.33, df = 54,
p = 0.0016), with a 75% of the dyads, switching to a cooperation strategy after further instruc-
tions were given between both rounds. Next, for the dyads that did cooperate we analyze the
verbal reports (Table 3) indicating why they switched strategies: 38.1% of the explanations
made reference to cooperation and 71.43% to maximization of points. Hence, a significant
number of participants explicitly understood the reasons that prompted them to change,
although a majority describes it as maximizing their gains without explicitly mentioning
cooperation.
Theoretical Framework
In this section, we describe a theoretical model that captures the most significant aspects of the
experiment presented in the paper. The purpose of this model is two fold: first, provide evi-
dence of how cooperation can be established in the equilibrium of a game that captures the
most important elements of the experiment that consisted in playing a series of TWG for 1
minute. Recall that we refer to the 1-minute series of games as a “round,” and to each individ-
ual TWG as a “game.” Second we run simulations to show that, within the parameter range in
which subjects are playing (typical times for cooperation or competing strategies), cooperation
is most often the strategy that results in higher payoffs.
As an abstraction of the main strategic decision of players, at the beginning of the round,
players choose whether to compete or to cooperate. During the round they can change their
Table 3. Classification of responses from players in Experiment 4 to the question of why they had changed strategies in the second round. Column
1 includes the answer to why they changed strategies. Column 2 is for whether they made reference to cooperation (1 indicates yes, 0 indicates no) and Col-
umn 3 is identical but for maximization of points.
Why did you change your strategy in the second round? Cooperation Maximization of
points
I lost incentives to compete and this way we could win one at a time 1 0
I lost incentives to compete and it was better to cooperate 1 0
Because in the ﬁrst round I did not think I could get more points through cooperation. When I was told that the
goal was simply to get points I did cooperate.
1 0
To get the highest amount of points 0 1
Because I sensed how my partner was playing 1 0
Because it is not possible to maximize both players’ utility if an agreement is not reached 1 1
In the 2nd round we did as much "wins" as possible 0 1
We changed strategy to reach the highest total score 0 1
Because the goal was to maximize the amount of points 0 1
To maximize the amount of points 0 1
I realized that the difference of points between players did not matter but the maximization of the score for both 1 1
The get the highest amount of points possible 0 1
By alternating the wins we could get the highest amount of points in the given time 1 1
It was suggested that there may be a better strategy 0 0
Because the assignment was to obtain the highest amount of points 0 1
Because the goal was to get more points 0 1
By changing the strategy we could both get the highest score 0 1
To reduce the amount of losses 0 1
Because the assignment was that we both should maximize the goal 1 1
Because I lost 0 0
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147125.t003
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mind, which typically happens when they initially decide to cooperate and then things do not
go as planned for the player with the consequence that they start competing as a punishment.
At games when players compete, they try to win games at all cost. Instead, when they cooperate
they make a tacit agreement to win and concede successive games in a way that can be benefi-
cial to both parties. The compete/cooperate decision represents a component of the strategy
space needed to support an equilibrium in which players alternate winning and losing, which is
the main insight arising from the experiment we performed. Below we discuss why the cooper-
ation agreement takes that particular form at equilibrium.
We first define the game that conceptualizes the behavior of players. A round is modeled as
a series of identical games, played until the time is up. After players decide if they are going to
cooperate or to compete, the actual action taken by players is to either try to win or to concede
each game. Hence, we describe the outcome of each individual game in terms of those two pos-
sibilities. The following matrix lists the probabilities of winning for player 1, the per-game util-
ity for both players, and the duration of the game, as a function of the selected action. Here, p is
the probability that player 1 wins, which depends on the skill and aggressiveness of each player.
Table 4 shows expected utilities arising from the Bernoulli random variables that capture
the process of winning a game. Since each game is constant-sum, both utilities always sum up
to 1. The key aspect of our model is that the duration of each game is given by normal random
variables with means and standard deviations that depend on whether competition is estab-
lished or not (μ1>μ2). When players take the same action, competition arises and the expected
game duration is large. Instead, when players take opposite actions, it is clear who will win and
hence the game finishes promptly. Note that μ1 and σ1 may depend on p since very unbalanced
opponents can be expected to end each game faster than those with similar skills. In any case,
for the purpose of the analysis we do here, we can consider that p, μ1, and σ1 are constants.
The player utility for the full round is the sum of the individual utilities in the games that
were played. First, let us discuss what happens when both players choose to compete for the
duration of the round (the case when just one player chooses to compete is similar). In that
case, each game will be represented by the win-win entry in Table 4, which results in games tak-
ing a long time. Consequently, rounds will consist of a small number of games. The total utility
of player 1 can be represented by the number of heads when flipping N1 coins whose head
probability is p, where N1 represents the expected number of games in the round and is
approximately equal to 60 sec / μ1. Conditionally on both players selecting the compete strat-
egy, the game is constant-sum since a utility of N1 wins must be distributed between both
players.
Second, we discuss the situation when both players cooperate throughout the round. We
make the assumption that players expect to win approximately half of the time when cooperat-
ing. This is a reasonable assumption since players do not know each other before the round
and hence they do not have strong priors regarding who the stronger or more skilled player is.
Table 4. Winning probabilities, player utilities and duration of each TWG.
Player 1 \ Player 2 Win Lose
Win Probability p 1
Utility p, 1-p 1, 0
Time N(μ1,σ1) N(μ2,σ2)
Lose Probability 0 P
Utility 0, 1 p, 1-p
Time N(μ2,σ2) N(μ1,σ1)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147125.t004
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Creating a cooperation strategy that achieves utilities for both players proportional to their win-
ning probabilities (p, 1-p) would be hard for the players of the experiment since (a) rounds are
not sufficiently long to represent arbitrary probabilities p, (b) players do not know p in advance,
and (c) players are not given sufficient time to realize what the optimal strategy is. Splitting the
total number of games in half is thus assumed to be a fair outcome given the situation.
There are many ways to split the total number of points in a round in halves. We now argue
that alternating winning and losing is the pattern to be expected. While repeatedly playing the
games of the 1-minute round, players are unlikely to keep track of time perfectly. In the experi-
ments we conducted, players seemed to be completely focused in playing the games, and there
was not a clock anywhere in the room to quickly glance at the time. Hence, it is reasonable to
assume that players are not perfectly informed about when the round is going to end. As a con-
sequence, the most reasonable way to cooperate is to alternate winning and conceding games.
This is robust since at any moment during the round the difference in total utility is less than
one. Of course, there are other ways to cooperate but since other alternatives are more cumber-
some they are unlikely to appear in practice (and we haven’t observed them in our experiments).
As a result of the earlier discussion, we make the simplifying assumption that the cooperation
strategy is based on an alternation of winning and losing for each player. When both players
compete, the number of games played in a minute N2 is approximately 60 sec / μ2, defined analo-
gously as N1 but with respect to the random variable N(μ2,σ2). The total expected utility for each
player is approximately N2/2.
It is important to highlight that the feature that enables cooperation at equilibrium is the
fact that players do not know when the game ends. Without randomness, the cooperation strat-
egy would unravel into competition since in the last game, the player supposed to lose would
have an incentive to compete anyway since she has nothing to lose. Then, in the previous-to-
last game, the player supposed to lose would anticipate that and try to win, and so on. In our
case, when players cooperate, each game is very short compared to the duration of the round
(a few seconds vs. a minute). Note that both players are continuously updating the probabilities
that the game is going to end as time goes by but they are not precise enough to compute on
whose turn the end is going to happen. For this reason, the round can finish with nearly 50%
probability when it is anybody’s turn to win, and, consequently, the previous strategic reason-
ing does not apply, enabling cooperation at equilibrium.
We have already argued that when cooperation is mutually selected, it is optimal for both
players to alternate winning and losing, assuming that they switch to the competitive strategy
immediately if anybody deviates from the prescribed behavior. Let us now see that cooperation
defined in this way is a subgame perfect equilibrium. Representing the initial compete-or-coop-
erate decision as a 2 by 2 normal-form game and already incorporating the ensuing conse-
quences of each strategic decision, we have the following outcome matrix.
Comparing both strategies from the perspective of player 1, the total utility is pN1 when
competing irrespective of the strategy of player 2. Instead, if player 2 cooperates, the utility of
player 1 is N2/2, or the same utility as before if player 2 competes.
We make the assumption that μ1> 2 μ2 p. It holds when the time spent playing a game
with a pre-agreed result is shorter than one played competitively, and when the probability that
each player wins is close to 0.5. Actually, for values of p close to 0.5, the inequality holds auto-
matically because μ1> μ2. In practice, as we illustrate below, this inequality holds for the val-
ues derived empirically from the experiments. Under the assumption, cooperation is a
(weakly) dominant strategy since the utilities corresponding to it are larger element-wise than
those corresponding to competition. Because this applies to both players and since the inequal-
ity is strict, cooperation is mutually a best response to the strategy of the other player, making
cooperation emerge as the unique Nash-equilibrium of the game.
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In summary, the conclusion of the previous theoretical analysis is that irrespective of what
the other player does, a player is (weakly) better off by selecting the cooperation strategy,
which in the second phase consists of trying to win and concede games alternatively. If at any
point in time a player does not behave according to the same strategy, the other player will
defect to trying to win at all costs from there on. The main assumptions we have made are that
players cannot accurately determine if the game is going to end during the turn they are sup-
posed to win or lose, and that μ1> 2 μ2 p. The theoretical result supporting cooperation at
equilibrium provides evidence for the empirical finding of our experiments.
One last point we want to highlight is that cooperation may create value, which is the driver
of the zero-sum fallacy. Indeed, summing the utility of both players in Table 5, we get that the
total utility is N1 if one player competes but it is N2 if both cooperate. This clearly illustrates
that the game is not constant-sum.
Finally, to illustrate the theoretical analysis and the conditions under which it is advanta-
geous to cooperate, we plot payoffs according to each strategy as a function of parameters esti-
mated from the experiments. This allows us to validate that the experiments agree with the
predictions of the theoretical model. Under cooperation, we observed that the typical time of a
game is about 2.6 seconds since opponents just need to agree to pin the thumb. There may be
some initial time to set up the strategy, but even when this time is taken into account, the
resulting duration is less than 4 seconds. Instead, under competition, we observed empirically
that the average duration of a game is about 15 seconds. We illustrate the distributions of dura-
tion under both strategies in the left panel of Fig 4.
Table 5. Anticipated total utilities when players select a strategy for the round.
Player 1 \ Player 2 Compete Cooperate
Compete p N1, (1-p) N1 p N1, (1-p) N1
Cooperate p N1, (1-p) N1 N2/2, N2/2
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147125.t005
Fig 4. Distribution of the duration of the game under competition and cooperation (left panel), and excess games that can be won by competition
with respect to cooperation (right panel).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147125.g004
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On the right panel of Fig 4, we indicate which strategy is more convenient as a function of
the probability of winning a game (x axis) and the average duration of a game when competing
(y axis). For the true average duration under a cooperation strategy, the plot depicts the differ-
ence between the games won under competition and those won under cooperation. We can see
how the optimal strategy depends on the parameters. When games played competitively are
short or when one player is much stronger than the opponent, the strong player prefers to com-
pete (lower right area of the plot with positive numbers). Instead, for longer games or for more
balanced players, cooperation is preferable (upper left area of plot with negative numbers). The
dotted line starting at the origin represents combination of parameters for which players are
indifferent between both strategies. For the band between the horizontal dotted lines, which
represents the durations we observed in practice, the dominant strategy is cooperation. This
validates our experiments and provides further evidence that our hypothesis holds.
Discussion
Our results provide strong evidence that people tend to compete albeit it is in their best interest
to cooperate. More importantly, we show that sub-optimal competition may result from a lack
of reflection on the instructions (even when they are expressed precisely and with full attention
of the players as in Experiment 1) since participants changed their behavior once the non zero-
sum aspect of the game was stressed. Competition may arise because of prior experience play-
ing this or other games, which may cue players to compete regardless of what the instructions
seem to indicate. While here we played a non-zero-sum version of TWG by playing as many
games as possible in one minute, the more traditional version (usually played in a best-of-three
format) is a zero-sum game. Hence it is likely that subjects will not pay attention to this fact
because they have the strong prior that this is a competition game. This could be understood as
a form of priming or inductive reasoning, where people project information from known cases
to the unknown [13,14]; or even of social influence [15]. A key aspect of our findings is that a
simple nudge, by just having people reflect on whether competition is the optimal strategy to
achieve their goal, promotes cooperation.
Competition causes pleasure when playing [16]. This was clear in our experiment; a simple
observation of the videos revealed that participants smiled much more during the first round
than during the second one. Thus it is also possible that people may be unwilling to cooperate
because the game becomes more boring. Similarly, participants may have a prior that making
an agreement to alternatively win and concede games may be some form of cheating. While
these motivations to avoid cooperation are possible, the most important fact is that when they
receive a nudge which questions about the optimality of competition, they almost always
switch to the strategy of alternating the winner. Hence people’s reluctance to collaborate can-
not be explained by the no-fun or alternating-wins-is-cheating hypotheses. These possible
behaviors may dominate only when the zero-sum fallacy prevents participants from clearly
understanding that cooperation is Pareto-dominant. This shows that the zero-sum fallacy
plays a significant role, above and beyond the effect of trust in people´s willingness to cooper-
ate. It is possible that the fraction that still does not cooperate may be due to the fact of the dis-
pleasure of losing.
What determines whether a player will or will not cooperate?. Of course answering such a
general question is beyond the reach of this manuscript but we hint several ideas. One relates
to trust, and as we stated in the introduction, has been the focus of ample work [4,5,6,7,17,18].
Here we present another idea, which is that players may fail to understand the benefit of coop-
eration. In our case, this comes from a strong prior. In the classic way of playing TWG there is
no gain in cooperating. Hence, just stating the objectives of the game does not suffice to
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override a strong competition heuristic. Re-emphasizing the possible benefits of cooperation
(even without making them explicit) helps players understand that cooperation may lead to
larger gains.
This result is reminiscent of investigations of framing effects (e.g., the work of Brañas [19]
on dictator games) and social value orientations (SVO) introduced by Messick and McClintock
[20] and McClintock [21]. The notion of SVO brings up the fact that people are not always self-
ishly motivated to maximize their own payoffs. A person’s SVO represent her preferences
regarding the allocation of resources such as money between themselves and others. Today,
SVO is usually studied as a stable individual trait [22,23] with individualistic, cooperative
(maximizing the payoff to both players), and competitive (maximizing the difference between
own and other’s payoffs) orientations. As a consequence, altruism (maximizing other’s pay-
offs), equality seeking (minimizing the difference between own and other’s payoffs) ended up
as part of it.
In an important study related to our work, Messick and McClintock [20] manipulated the
willingness to cooperate in the following way: the other player was referred to either as an
“opponent” (to induce a competitive SVO) or as a “partner” (to induce a cooperative SVO).
The authors also displayed the players’ accumulated scores in different ways to draw attention
to own payoffs, joint payoffs, or relative payoffs. More recent researchers have manipulated
SVO in other ways, and Abbink and Henning-Schmidt [24] commented that experimental
comparisons of neutral and suggestively framed games are surprisingly rare, but Yamagishi
et al. [25], Eriksson and Strimling [26], and others have reported effects. This is all in fact very
close to our research, where we state the TWG being a competitive game as the frame, and that
this can only be changed with an explicit instruction which can override the competitive frame.
We observed an intriguing gender difference in the number of dyads that cooperated. Over-
all, women were more inclined to compete. Other studies have consistently observed that gen-
der is an important factor of economic and strategic behavior [18]. Overall, it has been found
that in decisions without risk, such as a dictator game in which the player freely decides how to
split an endowment [27], women’s behavior is more altruistic. Instead, in decisions under risk
these differences vanish [18]. Another finding is the effect of chivalry; for instance, men accept
lower offers from women than for men in the ultimatum game [28]. Our results indicating that
women compete more are intriguing and somehow distinct from previous findings in eco-
nomic games. This certainly requires much more detailed investigation to discard two alterna-
tive explanations: either the internalization of the zero-sum fallacy depends on gender or, it
may be that even after understanding the fallacy, women are more likely to persist in compet-
ing behavior for the reasons outlined above (motivation of competition, feeling that cooperat-
ing is some kind of cheating, etc.).
There was a difference in the degree of cooperation between Experiments 1 and 2, which
may be explained by at least three different alternatives that cannot be distinguished from our
previous data: (a) Experiment 1 had monetary rewards. It is possible that when players under-
stand that cooperation is optimal, payoffs will motivate players to cooperate against all other
reasons to not cooperate (selfish desire to win, the fun of competition, the view that games
should not be arranged). Without payoffs, players may be more motivated to compete and play
than earning more points [29], [30]. (b) Players in Experiment 1 were more likely to know each
other (because they belonged to the same university campus) and thus it is possible that they
are more willing to cooperate (and yet rarely do so in the first round), and (c) Instructions were
delivered privately and in a quiet room in Experiment 1 and, instead, to a massive audience in
a noisy environment in Experiment 2. Hence it is likely that many of the players in Experiment
2 did not attentively listen to the instructions and hence missed the non-zero aspect of the
game. Of these alternatives we were able to discard Hypothesis 1 by performing an experiment
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analogous to Experiment 1 but without payoffs. Results show that the degree of cooperation
did not differ significantly in both treatments (60% without payoffs, 68.18% with payoffs,
Fisher exact comparison p = 0.7026).
We saw that the likelihood of cooperation in the second round depends on the imbalance of
players’ skills and strengths in the first round. A stronger player in the first round is less likely
to enter the cooperation agreement and will push on with competition. This can be rationalized
to indicate that this player does not need help from the other player to win as many points.
Nevertheless, we did not see that these players ended up making more points than those that
cooperated because every game was slower. Another factor that affected cooperation was
whether participants could talk or not in Experiment 2. Being allowed to talk increases the
chances of cooperation, which could be explained by the fact that one of the players is more
likely to quickly propose an agreement. An alternative explanation is that being allowed to talk
can induce players to know more about each other and hence creates empathy. In those cir-
cumstances players may find it harder to compete.
One specific benefit of our experimental procedure is that it involves a large sample that is
more heterogeneous than those in traditional laboratory experiments [8,12]. It has been dis-
cussed that many of the conclusions obtained in psychological experiments reflect aspects of
the very specific population of undergraduate students [9,10,11]. Our work relies on a crowd
experiment that shows that these conclusions are not specific to a relatively narrow segment of
the population. The participants in this activity were selected at random from a larger set of
30.000 applicants to TEDxRiodelaPlata (http://tedxriodelaplata.org/) which include people
with diverse educational backgrounds, professions, and ages. While we did not measure Socio
Economic Status or education background in our sample, simply looking at the age distribu-
tion, it is clear that the heterogeneity of our sample is much wider than a group of college
students.
Our work also contributes to solve whether it is possible to obtain reliable data in a large
sample. The crowd experiment allowed us to obtain a very large sample which provides a
unique possibility to address a) the issue of reliability which has been a matter of substantial
debate in psychological experiments [8] and b) as discussed above, the inference of psychologi-
cal principles based on a very limited segment of the population [9,10,11,12]. While there are
clear advantages to performing large-scale crowd experiments, there are also some concerns: a)
There is little control over whether people follow the instructions and monitoring their behav-
ior throughout the game is difficult. b) The data acquisition also relies on the participants of
the experiment. c) The participants’mindsets could be more focused in the entertainment, pos-
sibly diminishing external validity. Determining whether participants in a laboratory are more
valid and reliable than in a large audience is in essence an empirical endeavor. While our work
cannot respond which observable is closer to real-life decision making, we can shed light on
this issue by showing that results on a large audience are reliable and very similar to those
obtained in very controlled setups in a laboratory.
Our results provide a first step to develop strategies to override people’s tendency to com-
pete and to nudge the system to an optimal collective behavior. This may have an impact in
problems of great economic pertinence in our society. For instance, the situation that led us to
conduct the experiments described here was the fact that competition arises when car drivers
go through non-signalized intersections. In some societies, all drivers try to go before each
other, instead of taking turns as in other societies. This generates additional waiting time aris-
ing from suboptimal competition. Since the situation can be mapped to the TWG described in
the paper, one may wonder if some type of reminder shown in the intersections can nudge
cooperation and reduce driving time.
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